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2Broker Positions in Task-Specific Knowledge Networks:
Effects on Perceived Performance and Role Stressors in an
Account Management System
Abstract
In this paper we empirically investigate various benefits and costs associated with broker
characteristics of individuals who operate in the account management system of financial
service providers. We narrow our focus to broker positions in two specific task-specific
knowledge networks that facilitate account management. We study the effect of broker
positions on the contribution of individuals to organizational performance. We measure such
a contribution by measuring the perceptions of others concerning a particular individual. We
also explore how certain personal costs are associated with these task-specific broker
positions. More specifically, we explore how these positions affect role ambiguity and role
conflict, as self-perceived by that particular individual. To test the hypothesized effects we
collect data for a network consisting of 55 individuals. We conclude with stating that service
specification broker positions benefit organizations, but service delivery broker positions are
detrimental to an organization and that they also invoke personal costs.
Keywords: Social Networks, Task-Specific Broker Positions, Role Stress, Account
Management.
31. Introduction
In this paper we empirically investigate various benefits and costs associated with broker
characteristics of individuals who operate in the account management system of financial
service providers. We narrow our focus to broker positions in two specific task-specific
knowledge networks that facilitate account management. We study the effect of broker
positions on the contribution of individuals to organizational performance. We measure such
a contribution by measuring the perceptions of others concerning a particular individual. We
also explore how certain personal costs are associated with these task-specific broker
positions. More specifically, we explore how these positions affect role ambiguity and role
conflict, as self-perceived by that particular individual. To test the hypothesized effects we
collect data for a network consisting of 55 individuals. Before we turn to detailed discussions
of the topics mentioned above, in the remainder of this section we proceed with defining the
research area and reviewing the relevant literature.
Account management is defined as the set of customer-oriented processes involving
activities that develop and maintain beneficial relationships with important customers.
Account management allows organizations to offer competitive tailor-made products and
services. These offerings aim to deal with the unique and changing needs of customers, and
often they therefore require cooperation between various individuals (Cespedes, 1991, 1992,
1996; Shapiro & Moriarty, 1984).
For example, an account manager and a risk manager may collaborate on putting
together a loan proposal for a customer who wants to buy a new car. Once the customer has
agreed with the terms of the proposal, the two managers cooperate again by issuing the loan.
Continuing the example, suppose that a few months later the same customer wants a new roof
on the house. The account manager now starts cooperating with a mortgage specialist. It may
now be that the level of cooperation with the risk manager can decrease, but on the other
4hand it may also happen that the account manager initiates a link between the mortgage
specialist and the risk manager. Additionally, the three managers may also collaborate in
other workgroups that address the needs of other customers or other needs of the same
customer. As such, different cooperative structures might arise and each cooperative structure
could have a specific influence on how the cash-flow structures of the car and the roof get
established.
The above example suggests that the nature of the cooperation between individual
employees in an account management system can imply a certain level of service quality
(Shapiro & Moriarty, 1984; Zeithaml, Berry & Parasuraman, 1988). In fact it is well
understood that in financial service firms, cross-functional cooperation allows the integration
of various knowledge bases in order to generate competitive offerings (Cespedes, 1991;
Galbraith, 1994; Grant 1996; Shapiro & Moriarty, 1984). In our example, the account
manager presumably has detailed knowledge about the needs of a specific customer. The risk
manager likely knows more about the risk associated with these needs, as well as about the
risk the organization is willing to take. The combination of these two knowledge bases now
facilitates an adequate effort to serve the needs of the account.
An important consequence of customer orientation in account management systems is
that changes in customer-specific needs require changes in the knowledge composition of
cross-functional workgroups (Homans, 1950). As it is likely that these changes occur
continuously, the changes in the knowledge composition of workgroups result in the
emergence of knowledge exchange networks (Feld, 1981; Ibarra, 1992). These networks
could be thought of as being an imprint of cooperative activities within an organizational
context. In our running example, we observe that a knowledge exchange relationship between
the account manager and the risk manager emerges while they consider the loan for the car.
Furthermore, the new roof initiates a knowledge exchange relationship between the account
5manager and the mortgage specialist. These two relationships can be summarized into a
network containing knowledge exchange.
A basic premise in social network theory is that networks define the opportunities and
limitations that actors face concerning subsequent actions (Wasserman & Faust, [1994] 1997;
Galaskiewicz, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). Network positions not only indicate the distribution of
knowledge (Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000), but also indicate opportunities to integrate
knowledge. When it comes to knowledge exchange, broker positions encompass
characteristics that are relevant for knowledge integration (Burt, 1992, 1997a, 2000a; Hansen,
1999).
These advantages of broker positions can have substantial impact on account
management systems. Burt's (1992, 1997a) theory on structural holes indicates that such
advantages particularly concern opportunities to create added value by connecting otherwise
unconnected individuals. As such, brokers have access to and have control over different
knowledge bases. These advantages allow brokers to strive for efficiency when integrating
various knowledge bases. In our example the account manager could opt for not initiating a
relationship between the risk manager and the mortgage specialist, thereby perhaps simply
saving time and reducing effort.
Despite the advantages, the integration of knowledge by brokers not necessarily leads
to the attainment of organizational goals. For example, Burt (2000a) considers broker
positions within and between workgroups, and his study suggests that broker advantages may
not be congruent with workgroup goals in the first situation. This is because broker positions
within groups may lead to inefficiency in the interpretation of tasks, because such positions
indicate at least some absent relationships within the workgroup. These absent relationships
may indicate a sub-optimal degree of focussed communication, which in turn may contribute
to interpretive barriers (Feld, 1981; Dougerthy, 1992; Pelled, Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999). In our
6running example, the risk manager and the mortgage specialist might use different phrases for
similar matters (see Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). This may confuse the account manager and
hence he/she may loose time and slow down the service process.
In contrast to 'within group broker positions', Burt (2000a) suggests that broker
positions between workgroups do have a favorable impact on the workgroup goals. Between
group brokers contribute positively to the performance of the group, because they add to the
informational diversity of the group (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Jehn, Northcraft & Neale,
1997; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). In our example, the risk manager and another colleague
risk manager can have different ideas about the cash-flow structures required to finance
additional mortgage payments. The absence of a relationship between these two risk
managers would keep their ideas unknown to each other. The account manager may now
combine the best of both ideas when he/she has a relationship with the two risk managers and
might improve the cooperation upon meeting the needs of the customer.
The concept of informational diversity, which is relevant for our paper, refers to the
differences in knowledge bases and perspectives that members bring to the group (Jehn,
Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Informational diversity may lead to improved group performance,
although improvements are typically found to be task-specific (Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn et al.,
1999; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). Interestingly enough, in network studies which focus on
knowledge exchange networks and broker positions usually no distinction between various
tasks is made (see Burt, 2000a; Hansen, 1999; Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt and Wholey, 2000;
Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000). Therefore, in our paper we explicitly
aim to do so. We empirically test some hypotheses on the link between characteristics of
task-specific broker positions and their contribution to organizational performance.
Finally, broker positions can inflict personal costs due to increased stress (see Burt,
1997a). Role theory suggests that brokers are more susceptible to increases in role stressors
7(Merton, 1968; Kahn, Wolfe, Quin & Snoek, 1964). Although role stress does not necessarily
influences a job outcomes negatively, it is a personal cost as it absorbs coping resources
(Kahn et al., 1964; Singh, Goolsby & Rhoads, 1994). Two important role stressors are role
ambiguity and role conflict (Walker, Churchill & Ford, 1977; Brown & Peterson, 1993). As
brokers have contacts with otherwise unconnected others, it is likely that they have to deal
with more unclear or conflicting expectations. In this paper we therefore include a focus on
the effects of tasks on such expectations. To that end, we formulate and empirically test
hypotheses concerning the possibility that the link between broker positions and different role
stressors is task-specific.
To summarize, this paper aims to contribute to the relevant literature in the following
three ways. First, we examine the link between task-specific broker positions and
organizational performance. In particular, we consider the perceived contribution to
organizational performance of individuals across workgroups. Second, we examine the
personal costs for brokers within an account management system. We consider these in terms
of role ambiguity and of role conflict while allowing for variation across tasks. Finally, and in
contrast to most other literature we focus on a service organization.
This paper is built up as follows. In section 2, we identify two essential account
management tasks in services industries. In section 3, we present the theoretical background
of broker positions and of informational diversity in workgroups. In section 4, we formulate
hypotheses on the links between perceived performance, role stressors and task-specific
broker positions. In section 5, we discuss the collected method that we use in this study. In
section 6, we present the results of our analysis of empirical network data. In section 7, we
discuss these results, and we pay attention to the limitations of this study and the topics for
further research. Finally, in section 8 we draw some conclusions.
82. Tasks in Account Management
In knowledge intensive service firms, like for example, IT consultancy, banks, and, insurance
companies, account management systems are set up to stimulate cross-functional cooperative
activities (see Galbraith, 1994; Weitz & Bradford, 1999). Cross-functional workgroups
facilitate knowledge integration for individuals with specialized knowledge (see Ancona &
Caldwell, 1992; Dougherty, 1992; Grant, 1996; Hackman, 1987). These groups are supposed
to develop competitive tailor-made products and services (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander,
1992). In this paper we focus on two tasks in account management that depend on knowledge
integration.
Two tasks in (financial) service industries are particularly dependent on knowledge
integration. Zeithaml, Berry & Parasuraman (1988) indictae that performance in service
industries depends on the attainment of service specification and service delivery tasks. To
accomplish each task, specific knowledge is required (see Nelson & Winter, 1982; Ruekert &
Walker 1987; Russell, [1948] 1961; Simon, [1957] 1997). Accomplishment of the service
specification task depends on knowledge about which service specifications will serve
accounts in a satisfactory way. More specifically, the execution of the service specification
task, which usually involves decisions on which bundles of services should be offered, results
in a tailor-made service specification like the architectural innovations discussed in
Henderson & Clark (1990). The second task, that is service delivery, requires knowledge on
how and when to implement a service specification. Once a customer has accepted a service
specification, the implementation of the specification should lead to the realization of
services and hence to the accomplishment of the service delivery task.
In our example, the account manager and risk manager may discuss which financial
constructions would secure the payments for the car loan. Such constructions could for
example aim to minimize the risk for the parties involved or aim to maximize the amount of
9money involved. Once the account agrees with a certain proposal, it has to be implemented.
This requires knowledge of the routines and procedures within the organization that allow the
delivery of the service. Different kinds of check-ups then need to be done. For example,
money will get transferred to the car dealer in time, but not before collateral check-ups have
been performed and different departments within the bank have approved the loan.
Naturally, the exchange of knowledge within cross-functional teams depends on the
exchange of information. We will indicate the information that carries knowledge relevant for
service specification tasks as service specification information. Similarly, there is service
delivery information.
To summarize this section, the service specification and service delivery tasks in
account management require the integration of different types of knowledge bases. From
these knowledge bases different types of knowledge need to be integrated for each specific
task. The integration of knowledge occurs through the transfer of information.
In the following sections we will conjecture that continuous information exchange
establish a network of relationships. These information exchange networks have a substantial
impact on the opportunity for individuals to integrate knowledge. Below we consider
concepts like network positions of individuals and various aspects of broker positions that
supposedly are relevant for knowledge integration.
3. Broker Positions
In account management the attainment of tasks depends on knowledge integration (see
Shapiro & Moriarty, 1984). The total of the information exchange between individuals,
which enables knowledge integration for a specific task, defines a task-specific network. In
this paper we consider a service specification network and a service delivery networks. In this
section we focus on broker positions within these networks.
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A network consists of individuals and of the relationships between these individuals
(Wasserman & Faust, [1994] 1997). These relationships are channels through which
(knowledge) resources flow (Podolny & Baron, 1997; Burt, 1997b). The specific
configuration of all relationships is called the network structure. The network structure
defines the network positions of each individual within the network, where a network
position of an individual refers to the structural characteristics of the organizational context.
3.1 Aspects of Broker Positions
The structural characteristic of a broker position is that this position links two or more
otherwise unconnected other individuals in a network (see Adams, 1976; Burt, 1992, 1997a,
2000a; Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Marsden,
1982; Simmel, 1964). Previous research has identified some relevant consequences of this
structural aspect for knowledge integration in account management processes (see Simmel,
1964; Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992, 1997a, 2000a; Krackhardt, 1995; Hansen, 1999). First,
a broker has a better access to a broad scope of relevant and valuable knowledge than others
have. Second, a broker is quicker informed about new developments. Third, a broker is more
often referred to and consulted, and this provides easier access to different knowledge bases.
Finally, a broker is able to filter, choose and mediate knowledge between unconnected actors.
3.2 Informational Diversity and Broker Positions
The above four characteristics of broker positions imply that the contribution of individuals
in broker positions to workgroup performance is related to informational diversity, where
such diversity refers to the differences in knowledge bases and perspectives that members
bring to the group (Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Academic studies on the effects of
informational diversity usually focus on informational diversity within groups. In these
studies, informational diversity is usually measured by assessing variables like educational
level, functional background and formal position in the organization (see Jehn, et al., 1999;
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Pelled, Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). The common assumption is
then that similarity across variables reduces diversity.
Besides individual specific variables, it may well be that the workgroup themselves
have an effect on individuals. In fact, Hackman (1990, p.225) emphasizes the importance of
these on the knowledge and skills of individuals. Similarly, we would argue that somehow
being involved in to different workgroups, temporal as well as intertemporal, has an effect on
the opportunities of individuals to contribute to and to have control over informational
diversity within these workgroups. This means that individuals in broker positions may
contribute to informational diversity because they have access to a broad scope of knowledge
bases. This allows brokers to accumulate heterogeneous knowledge more than individuals in
non-broker positions. An individual in a broker position thus adds to the informational
diversity of the workgroup to which he/she belongs. Individuals in broker positions can also
control their contribution to informational diversity. A broker has more opportunities to filter,
choose and mediate knowledge flows and thus can control the informational diversity within
the group better than non-brokers can.
It should be noted that both the accumulation of heterogeneous knowledge and the
control over informational diversity are broker aspects that assume the independence of
knowledge between different individuals. One important assumption in social network theory
is that a direct link between individuals makes their knowledge more similar (Granovetter,
1973). Hence, the knowledge of an individual depends on the knowledge of those who are
directly linked to that individual. When two individuals are only indirectly linked, we say that
their knowledge is less dependent. Two actors who are not linked at all are said to have
independent knowledge.
Contributing to informational diversity occurs through combining and recombining
different knowledge sources. Individuals who have many opportunities to accumulate
12
heterogeneous knowledge unlikely exchange overlapping knowledge. The exchange of
overlapping knowledge is inefficient because it wastes time and effort. It is the efficiency of
the set of relationships of an individual that allows for accumulating heterogeneous
knowledge (Burt, 1992). In our example, when the account manager, the mortgage specialist
and the risk manager exchange knowledge it is almost inevitable that redundant knowledge
exchanges will occur.
The control over informational diversity within a workgroup depends on the relative
scarcity of knowledge within a knowledge base. Less knowledge implies less opportunity to
choose how to contribute to informational diversity, that is to control over the informational
diversity within a workgroup.
Note that efficiency does not take into account the scarcity of knowledge (Burt,
1997a). When an individual has access to a specific knowledge base, he/she controls the
informational diversity that this knowledge base adds to the workgroups of which he/she is a
member. The strength of this control depends on the opportunity to complement or replace a
contact in a specific knowledge base with another contact that provides independent
knowledge from the same knowledge base. Hence, controlling informational diversity does
not depend on the lack of relationships between individuals who share a specific knowledge
base.
To fix concepts, it now seems useful to consider an exemplary service specification
task for illustrative purposes. In our example, once the car loan is given and the mortgage is
raised to finance the roof, the account manager encounters a mortgage need with another
account. The concept proposal for a new mortgage construction that the account manager and
mortgage specialist have made turns out to be very competitive. However, it also bears high
risk. To deal with this risk in a responsible way, while at the same time not giving up the
competitive aspects of their concept, they agree that the account manager will discuss matters
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with with risk management. Suppose that the risk managers do not often exchange much
information about concept proposals, and suppose that the account manager presents the
proposal to two risk managers independently. Weighting the independent knowledge of both
risk managers about high-risk deals now enables the account manager to exercise control
over informational diversity within the workgroup with the mortgage specialist. This control
can be higher than it would have been in the situation where both risk managers do exchange
information about proposals.
In the measurement section below, we formally define both efficiency and the degree
to which actors are constraint in controlling informational diversity. However, we already
mention here that efficiency is a positive measure of the accumulation of heterogeneous
knowledge, while constraint is a negative measure of controlling informational diversity. In
the next section we therefore formulate hypotheses in terms of "accumulation of
heterogeneous knowledge" and "lack of control over informational diversity" in workgroups.
4. Hypotheses
In this section we first formulate hypotheses about the relations between broker positions and
organizational performance. Informational diversity has been suggested to enhance problem
solving ability and creativity of a workgroup (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). However, this
may be important for some tasks, it may be unimportant or detrimental for other tasks. This
implies that broker positions in some cases can be less beneficial from an organizational
perspective. Next, in this section we formulate hypotheses about the relation between broker
positions and the personal costs that may come with these positions. We expect broker
positions to positively influence role stress. However we also expect that different types of
information have a different effect on role stressors.
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4.1 Task-Specific Broker Positions and Performance
Workgroup performance depends on the extent to which social processes maintain or enhance
the capability of group members to cooperate on subsequent tasks (Hackman, 1987). Account
management encompasses social processes that correspond with the attainment of different
tasks. More precise, task-related knowledge exchange networks mirror how these tasks are
executed. Network positions define the organizational context of actors, and these give
meaning to the knowledge they possess and these allow utilization of that knowledge
(Granovetter, 1985; Nelson & Winter, 1982, p.105). More specifically, network positions
reflect how workgroup members contribute to the transformation of workgroup inputs into
workgroup outputs (see Hackman, 1987; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993).
Broker positions in information exchange networks reflect how actors contribute to
informational diversity, based on their current and previous cooperative activities. A broker
position may be beneficial to a workgroup outcome when the broker characteristics
contribute to the attainment of some group or organizational goal (Williams & O'Reilly,
1998). A workgroup that has to make decisions concerning a service specification benefits
from knowledge of a broad scope of specification opportunities that the organization offers.
Therefore, accumulation of heterogeneous knowledge on these specification opportunities
may improve the ability of individuals to contribute to the task of service specification. Also,
the ability to control informational diversity will positively influence the perceived
contribution to organizational performance. Indeed, control over informational diversity
allows for better decision making because various alternatives have been considered and may
have been offered to the workgroup.
In our example, to attain the task of service specification, an account manager might
be sufficiently able to combine the mortgage knowledge as well as the risk management
knowledge. This implies that in the workgroup a combination of independent ideas gets
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presented. This increases informational diversity in the workgroup and may enhance
creativity and as such the competitiveness of the mortgage specification. The broker position
of the account manager implies that the mortgage specialist and the risk manager both save
time, while revenues may increase. We therefore expect that both will perceive the
contribution of the account manager to organizational performance to be positive. To
summarize, we put forward the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The amount of heterogeneous knowledge, that an individual can
accumulate due to his or her position in a service specification network, positively
effects his or her contribution to organizational performance.
Hypothesis 1b: In a service specification network, a lack of control over
informational diversity in workgroups negatively effects the contribution of an
individual to organizational performance.
It should be mentioned that the scope of knowledge that individuals possess might
imply a lack of ability to provide in-dept knowledge. Indeed, brokers may frustrate the
attainment of tasks in processes where depth of knowledge is valued over the scope of
knowledge. For example, a knowledge specialist in a broker position may be aware of many
constructions to attain an optimal cash flow across various situations. However, in processes
related to the service delivery task, detailed knowledge of implementing constructions is
needed. A specialist with broad knowledge may have insufficient knowledge to adequately
contribute to the delivery of the appropriate services. Also, the unique bundles of services
offered in account management usually require a non-standard fine-tuning of different service
components. A homogeneous interpretation of information is then required. It turns out that
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coordination by mutual adjustment has been found to be effective in these situations
(Thompson, 1967).
Individuals in broker positions however face an organizational context that does not
allow for coordination by mutual adjustment. Broker control mimics the control that a
hierarchical structure offers to increase informational diversity. Such control could be
detrimental to the processes when coordination by mutual adjustment is needed (Thompson,
1967). Although a broker can have an opportunity to shape the processes (and their
outcomes) to his/her own ideas, this can result in inefficiently and slowly accomplished
outcomes.
In our example, when the account manager chooses not to bring together two
specialists representing distinct knowledge bases, he/she frustrates the possibility for mutual
adjustment. The lack of relationships within an department, but outside the workgroup, might
frustrate cooperation within the workgroup. Consider the example in which the account
manager approaches two risk managers with independent knowledge. Combining the
knowledge on what to offer may lead to a creative competitive solution. However, combining
the knowledge on how to implement this offer may lead to inconsistent and changing
implementation procedures. A mortgage specialist confronted with continuously changing
procedures could become less satisfied with the implementation process.
We summarize the above conjectures in the the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a: The amount of heterogeneous knowledge, that an individual can
accumulate due to his or her position in a service delivery network, negatively effects
his or her contribution to organizational performance.
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Hypothesis 2b: In a service delivery network, a lack of control over informational
diversity in workgroups positively effects the contribution of an individual to
organizational performance.
4.2 Task-Specific Broker Positions and Role Stress
It has been suggested that broker positions come with personal costs such as uncertainty,
stress and conflict (Burt, 1997a; Friedman & Podolny, 1992). From a role set perspective it
may be argued that actors in broker positions are more often confronted with strain. Role set
theory defines that a role set constitutes an array of associated roles of an actor in a certain
status or position (see Merton, 1968, p.423). These roles materialize in the relationships of
the focal actor (Burt, 1982). Through these relationships, others communicate their
expectations with the focal actor with more or less pressure. Role ambiguity represents the
uncertainty felt by a focal actor due to a the lack of (explicit) information on these
expectations. Role conflict occurs when a focal actor faces conflicting expectations.
However, in their study of the effect of broker positions on role conflict Friedman &
Podolny (1992) suggest that "…the existence of conflicting signals does not necessarily mean
that the same individual needs to be the object of these signals. It is possible for individuals to
specialize in terms of enacting different dimensions of … role expectations" [emphasis
added]. As the identification of task-specific broker positions isolates a specific dimension of
role expectations, a natural question that arises concerns whether different dimensions of role
expectations defined by different tasks equally influence different role stressors?
4.2.1 Role Ambiguity
Individuals that seek knowledge on unfamiliar services have to deal with some intrinsic
uncertainty about this knowledge. In our example, the account manager may have doubts on
whether the skills of a specialist suffice to deliver the service aspect that best fit the needs of
a customer. Because, skills are complex and come forward from knowledge that is tacit to
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some degree, there is inevitably some ambiguity regarding the scope of a skill (Nelson &
Winter 1982, p.88). This uncertainty may inflict role ambiguity on a focal actor that receives
this information (Hartline & Ferrel, 1996; Spreitzer, 1996). Uncertainty about whether the
skills of others are relevant creates ambiguity about the job that has to get done. For example,
when an account manager faces a plethora of uncertain possibilities to match a need of a
customer, this may generate confusion on what he/she thinks is expected of him/her. This
effect seems immediate in service specification, but less so in service delivery. In the latter
task, the availability of the specification about what is expected reduces uncertainty. Indeed,
the execution of service delivery tasks may only start once a service specification has been
established and accepted by a customer. Knowledge exchanges in service delivery processes
explicate when and how things have to be done. We summarize the above in the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3a: A broker position in a service specification network will correspond
more role ambiguity than a broker position in a service delivery network.
4.2.2 Role Conflict
The explicit expectations on when and how things have to be done in service delivery are
more likely to increase role conflict. Indeed, role conflict is about known but conflicting
expectations. The explicit knowledge in service production networks is more likely to cause
role conflict than the more tacit knowledge in service specification. For example, the
knowledge of a specialist about which distinctive services two different accounts need, is
unlikely to generate role conflict. However, knowing that both services need to be delivered
at the same time may inflict role conflict.
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Hypothesis 3b: A broker position in a service delivery network will correspond with
more role conflict than a broker position in a service specification network.
In the next section we elaborate on the empirical method we use in order to examine the
validity of the above hypotheses.
5. Method
In this section we discuss our sample, the questionnaire and the relevant measures. We also
discuss the method used to test the hypotheses.
5.1 Sample
The data have been collected within a branch of an international financial service provider in
a Dutch metropolitan area. This organization utilizes an account management system in
which specialists support account managers. However, the latter managers have no
hierarchical authority over the former. The network includes 57 employees who work within
5 different departments; 4 specialist departments and 1 account managers department. The
account managers department operates in 6 teams, where each account manager has the direct
support of one or two internal account managers that support in advice and clerical duties.
Each account team serves over a large number of customers (100 to 150) in the "Private
Banking"-market segment. This segment consists of well-off individuals, mostly successful
entrepreneurs, who need financial services for them and/or for their businesses.
Certain technical characteristics, such as complexities in tax regulations, sizable risk
and the intertwining of personal and business finance, make it necessary for the account
managers to bring in support from one or more different specialists. Specialists also have to
deal with the requests of account managers operating in other market segments, and some of
then specialists have to deal with external intermediaries or with clients directly.
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The network boundary has been set after consultation with the local management
team. We decided to consider those specialist departments that directly contribute to service
specification and service delivery in the "Private-Banking"-segment.
5.2 Measurement
A questionnaire has been developed that measures (among other things) the role stress
variables, performance and the knowledge exchange networks. Also, we measure some
control variables, which are known to effect workgroup outcome.
With the departmental approach we could explicitly define the network boundary
(Marsden, 1990). This allows for the identification of the individuals who are relevant for the
account management processes in the "Private Banking"-segment. The names of these
individuals have been subsequently attached to each question.
The performance and the knowledge exchange networks have been measured with
questions in roster format (Wasserman & Faust, [1994] 1997). The roster questions
correspond with the service specification and service delivery networks that are under study
here. This way of collecting data makes data less biased as opposed to ego centered data
collection (Wasserman & Faust, [1994] 1997). From the answers we construct socio-matrices
to represent the networks.
The final response to the questionnaire has been 96% (55 respondents). This response
rate was achieved by directly contacting non-respondents (telephonically). We asked if there
were any reasons why they did not reply. The usual primary answer was that respondents
lacked time. Another reason for the initial non-response was a concern about confidentiality.
However, we could sufficiently neutralize most concerns  by assuring that nobody besides the
researchers would see results at the individual level. The main argument we used was that it
would be extremely detrimental to the researchers to violate this confidentiality. We were
then able to ask for a commitment to respond after stressing the importance of 100% response
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rate for this type of research. The maximum number of these personal reminders was 5. Data
collection effectively took 7 weeks.
To calculate the performance and broker measures we use the socio-matrices. The
role stress variables have been measured using standard psychometric scales. In the
subsequent part of this section we discuss these measures in more detail. Also, we discuss the
control variables.
5.2.1 Performance
To measure performance, we ask respondents to consider the question: "Please consider
those of the people listed below with whom you have cooperated to serve a customer in the
last six months. How successful was this cooperation for the organization?"  In the
introduction to this question we explicitly defined organizational success as: "Organizational
success is success for [company name] such as profits, customer retention or increasing
customer satisfaction as a result of cooperation." Respondents could rate the level of success
on a 5-point scale (1 = very negative, 2 = negative, 3 = no attribution to success, 4 = positive
and 5 = very positive).
We calculate the perceived contribution to organizational performance of individual j
(OPj) by the following equation,
j
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where i is an individual who cooperates with focal individual j and nj is the total number of
individuals that cooperate with individual j. The variable OPj is the average perception by
actors i of the performance of the focal individual j. Note that OPj gives a score that does not
depend on the self-perception of the focal individual.
To examine to what extent this single item unambiguously measures the contribution
to organizational performance, we check its concurrent validity. For this purpose we use a
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database on the sales of four services by account managers. This database contains
information on about 1000 actual sales of the 6 account managers in the six months preceding
the distribution of the questionnaire. To get comparable performance measures across the
different products, we normalize (mean), aggregate and average the sales figures into 24
comparable performance measures. For 23 of these measures we are able to derive clusters of
specialists that cooperated with the account manager in establishing these sales. We calculate
the average perceived performance that these clusters indicate concerning the performance of
the account managers. These perceived performance measures can be compared with the 23
actual performance indicators.
To check for concurrent validity we calculate the Kendall's tau-b correlation between
the actual and perceived performance measures. Kendall's tau-b correlation is a rank order
correlation that compares all possible pairs for both variables. This implies that n(n-1)/2 pairs
are to be compared, where n is the number of performance measures (here, n=23). A
concordant pair is a pair of observations, which has the same sign for the difference between
both variables. For example, X1 – X2 and Y1 –Y2 are either both positive or negative. A
discordant pair corresponds with opposite signs. For example, X1 – X2 is positive (negative)
while Y1 –Y2 is negative (positive). The odds ratio between concordant and discordant pairs
determines the value of Kendall tau-b correlation coefficient.
For our performance measures we obtain a Kendall tau-b correlation of 0.31, which
corresponds with a one-sided p-value of 0.02. We use a one-sided test because we expect a
positive relation. This result supports concurrent validity. To calculate the odds ratio, we
ignore pairs that have zero difference on one or both variables. The odds ratio between
concordant and discordant pairs is about 2, and this implies that 2 out of 3 pairs have the
same sign. We continue our analysis while using the perceived contribution to organizational
performance measure in (1).
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5.2.2 Role Stressors
We measure role ambiguity and role conflict by adapting the 5-point scales items from Rizzo,
House & Lirtzman (1970) (see table 1). To check for uni-dimensionality and for internal
consistency of the measures we proceed as follows. First, initial confirmatory factor analyses
are used to assess the contribution of the items to the scale. Second, uni-dimensional scales
are derived. Finally, we examine these scales on internal consistency.
*** Insert table 1 about here ***
Initial confirmatory factor analysis of the role ambiguity scale reveals low contributions of
item 1 and 4 (see table 1). These items are subsequently deleted resulting in a 5-item scale
(?2=4.61, df=5, p=0.46, RMSEA=0.00, AGFI=0.90; a=0.91). The fit statistics and a-value
indicate one dimensionality and sufficient reliability of this scale.
The initial confirmatory factor analysis on the 9 item role conflict measure caused
some doubt about the uni-dimensionality of this construct (?2=42.32, df=27, p=0.03,
RMSEA=0.10, AGFI=0.75). An explorative factor analysis reveals two distinct factors. A
confirmatory factor analysis on the 6 items contributing most to the first factor results in a
better fitting model (?2=8.14, df=9, p=0.52, RMSEA=0.00, AGFI=0.89). The Cronbach-a of
this construct is 0.85 indicating sufficient reliability. Notice that the items for role conflict
have in common that they emphasize the effect of lack of resources on role conflict, and this
should be taken into account when interpreting the results below.
5.2.3 Broker Position Measures
Our measures of broker positions should have two properties. First, a task feature
should represent the specific network for which we measure the broker position. Second, the
measures should reflect the extent to which individuals have broker characteristics. We aim
to capture the task feature by identifying two different types of knowledge exchange
networks. For each network we separately calculate to what extent individuals have the two
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broker characteristics. The first characteristic, that is, the accumulation of heterogeneous
knowledge, is measured by the efficiency of a network position. The second characteristic,
that is the control over workgroup informational diversity, is measured by the constraint of a
network position. Both measures are derived from Burt (1992). We will now first discuss the
measurement of the networks and after that we discuss measuring the broker characteristics.
Knowledge exchange networks concern in information exchanges between pairs of
individuals. We measure these information exchanges using two roster questions. Prior to the
questions which should provide a map of the networks, we explicitly define the two types of
information of our interest. First, “…service specification information is information related
to the integration of service bundles to be advised, proposed and/or offered to a customer”.
Secondly, “…service delivery information is defined as information related to the
'production' of accepted advice, proposals and/or offerings.”
We formulate two roster questions to measure the information exchange. In the
questions we ask, "How frequently do you exchange each type of information with those
listed when they cooperated with you in servicing a customer?" In order to reduce potential
irritation and boredom with the respondent, we introduce a different scale than in the
previous questions. Respondents can indicate frequency of information exchange on
continuous scales. These scales range from  "hardly ever"  to "very often" . We transform the
data from these continuous scales to 7-point scales to make data entry more convenient.
The resulting socio-matrices are used to calculate two distinct broker measures for the two
relevant characteristics of broker positions. The first measure concerns the extent to which
the network structure allows an individual to accumulate heterogeneous knowledge. The
second measure concerns the extent to which the network structure constrains an individual
to control informational diversity in workgroups. The measures are based on the efficiency
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and constraint measures respectively, which Burt (1992) proposes to use as indicators of
broker advantages.
To determine the amount of superfluous or redundant knowledge that an actor i
exchanges with an actor j, Burt (1992) combines two variables. First, piq is the proportion of
information exchanged with actor q, relative to the total amount of knowledge exchanges in
which i is involved, that is,
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and zij is a socio-matrix that indicates the valued information exchange relationships between
i and j.
The second variable mjq represents the marginal amount of knowledge exchanged
between j and q, defined by the relative importance of exchanges between j and q as
compared to the largest exchange j makes, that is,
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This variable allows for an inter-subjective comparison of the importance of the relation
between j and q. When multiplying the two variables in (2) and (3), we weight the proportion
of information exchanged with q with the relative importance of the information exchanged
between j and q (from j's viewpoint).
The product piqqjq defines the amount of redundant knowledge exchanged between i
and j, due to their mutual link with q. Summing over q defines the total amount of redundant
knowledge that is exchanged between i and j, that is,
jiqmp
q
jqiq ,     ¹å (4)
Naturally, one minus the amount of redundant knowledge is the amount of non-redundant
knowledge exchanged. Summing this over j gives the amount of non-redundant information
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that i could accumulate. To normalize the scores this expression has to be divided by the
number of individuals in the network (N). Taking this together we define individual i's
network efficiency, which is a relative measure of the heterogeneity in knowledge that an
individual may accumulate due to his/her network position, by
jiq
N
mp
j q
jqiq
,     
)1(
¹
-å å
(5)
The constraint measure proposed in Burt (1992) concerns the lack of control on the
informational diversity within a workgroup. It is formally defined as the adjusted sum of the
amount of information that a focal individual exchanges directly and indirectly with others.
The adjustment reflects the degree to which there is a lack of relationships between
individuals who offer knowledge from the same knowledge base. As such, constraint
measures the control aspect of brokerage.
The constraint measure consists of three elements. The first is the information that i
directly and indirectly exchanges with j. The second is the degree to which i can broker this
information (that is, the number of individuals with whom i has and j has no relationship).
The third element concerns the degree to which j has relationships with an individual t within
the same knowledge base as j. The first and second elements are measured by
jiqppp
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Burt (1992) suggests to take the squares of this expression, that is,
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As regards to the third element, our collected sample data allow us to use the most
rigorous option which is suggested in Burt (1992). This option amounts to calculating a
centrality measure based on the cluster of which j is a member. The departments to which the
actors belong determine the clusters. These departments are the knowledge bases, which
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allow the actors to contribute to the attainment of tasks in account management. Missing
relationships around j within his/her department increase control for i. In sum, constraint is
measured by
jiqOppp
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where OAj is defined as:
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where bAjt = 1 whenever j indicates to have an information exchange relation with colleague t
who is a member of the same department A as j is, and bAjt = 0 otherwise. TA is the total
number of colleagues in department A. Hence, OAj is the proportion of the members of
department A with whom j has a relationship. This measure of OAj incorporates the scarcity of
the knowledge of j in the organization. When TA gets smaller, knowledge get scarcer and each
relationship that j has within his/her department will attribute more to i's constraint. When
summing (8) over j we get the constraint for individual i.
5.3 Control Variables
Recall that informational diversity refers to differences in knowledge bases and perspectives
that members bring to a workgroup. In workgroup diversity research, measures of
informational diversity usually concern heterogeneity of education, functional area in the firm
and position in the firm (see McGrath, Arrow & Berdahl, 2000; Jehn, Chadwick & Thatcher.
1997; Jehn, et al., 1999).
Informational diversity is a characteristic of workgroups and therefore a contextual
characteristic for individuals. We assume the following. If the set of individuals with whom a
particular individual collaborates displays high informational diversity, the average
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informational diversity in the different workgroups to which this particular individual belongs
active in will also be high. The individual measure reflects the group measure.
Commonly applied measures for informational diversity such as for example,
education, functional area, and position, are nominal variables. To express informational
diversity using nominal variables often an index is used that was introduced by Teachman
(1980). We adapt this index to measure the informational diversity across the direct contacts
of the actors in the networks of our interest.
First, we establish the set of direct cooperative contacts of each actor. We do this by
summing the socio-matrices that represent the specification and delivery tasks networks, that
is,
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The xij represents the frequency of information exchange and the superscript s denotesare the
two networks (s=1,2). For our purposes, we dichotomize xij, which results in
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Here yij represents the set of direct relationships of each individual i. Furthermore, we
establish in which outcome category each individual j belongs, using the nominal variable ckj
defined by
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The Teachman-measure involves the proportion of individuals in each category. The
proportion of direct contacts of an individual i who belongs to category k is defined by
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This proportion is used to construct,
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where m is the number of categories in a measure and where Pki is defined in (13). When a
category has proportion zero it is not used in the calculations (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992).
Based on three observed nominal variables (education, functional area and position)
we calculate three proxies of informational diversity of the workgroup context as noted by the
individuals. The informational diversity based on  department membership and position turn
out to be highly correlated (? = 0.78). To avoid multi-collinearity problems we combine both
proxies by taking the average of the two for each individual.
Finally, two other control variables we use are education and function tenure. These
variables indicate individual knowledge and experience levels, and they both could have a
positive influence on the contributions to performance. Furthermore we expect that
experience is negatively related with role stressors.
5.4 Tests
To test our hypotheses we use two statistical techniques. First, we consider OLS regression
models. The estimated coefficients indicate the effects of broker variables on the three
dependent variables (contribution to performance, role ambiguity and role conflict). We also
test whether the addition of the set of broker variables significantly increases the explained
variance.
Second, we extend our analysis with Wald-tests. These tests allow us to exmine
whether two coefficients differ significantly in size. This test is especially employed to test
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hypotheses 3a and 3b. A shortcoming of Wald tests is that it is a pure significance test of the
null hypothesis that certain coefficients are equal (Greene, 2000). This may limit the power of
this test, at least for one specific purpose. To assess the empirical probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis when it is false, that is, rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal
when they differ, we run a Monte Carlo experiment using 10.000 simulations. In each
simulation run we first generate Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict scores per individual using
the estimated model and normally distributed errors. These error terms have mean zero and
variance equal to the estimated residual variance. Next, we re-estimate the models and
calculate Wald test statistics. The fraction of simulation runs where the Wald test rejects the
null hypothesis determines the probability of rejection when coefficients do differ. The
empirical power of the test thus indicates to what extent the test correctly indicates
differences between coefficients.
6. Results
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations and Pearson correlation coefficients for all
dependent, broker and control measures. The correlation properties of the data reveal that the
highest correlation is 0.70 (for specification efficiency with delivery efficiency). A general
rule of thumb is that levels of correlation exceeding 0.75 may lead to multicollinearity
problems (Tsui, Ashford, St. Clair & Xin, 1995). Although 0.70 is less than this benchmark,
it is close, and therefore we examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the independent
variables. This statistic measures the extent to which the variance of a specific independent
variable can be explained by the other independent variables. The highest VIF value we
obtain is for specification efficiency (3.08), which means that about 67% of its variance can
be explained by the other independent variables. Based on these results we confidently decide
to maintain all variables for further analysis.
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***Insert table 2 about here***
The inspection of the correlation coefficients in table 2 furthermore reveals that role
ambiguity is significantly (at the 5% level) and positively related to our performance
measure. Although this issue is not key to our study, this result confirms earlier findings that
role ambiguity is not necessarily detrimental to performance (see Singh et al., 1994).
Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between the efficiency and constraint
measures. As the latter is a negative measure and the former a positive measure of broker
positions, a negative relationship between the two measures may have been anticipated.
However, a positive correlation is not inconsistent. It rather seems to imply that the
opportunity to accumulate heterogeneous knowledge and the lack of control on informational
diversity are two distinct characteristics of broker positions. Furthermore, the positive
correlation implies a specific network structure, which is characterized by low density within
departments and higher density between departments. The positive correlation between
constraint and efficiency occurs because both are low. First, efficiency is low because in
cross-functional workgroups similar individuals have contacts. Second, constraint is low
because within knowledge bases, like departments, less knowledge exchange occurs.
As mentioned earlier, we use regression analysis to estimate the parameters. The
estimated equations are represented in table 3. Model 1 is used to test the hypotheses 1a to
2b. The results show that adding the broker measures improve the fit of the model (F-value
? R2 = 4.09, p<0.01). The coefficient estimates are seen to give support for H1b, H2a and
H2b. The coefficients of specification constraint, delivery efficiency and delivery constraint
are significant and have the anticipated signs. With regard to H1b we find no significant
effect, as the parameter for the specification efficiency variable is not significant. The
informational diversity measure based on departmental and positional differences of
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collaborators has a significant positive effect. The other control variables however have no
traceable effects on perceived performance.
***Insert table 3 about here***
The results of Model 2 are consistent with H3a. The effects of both measures of
broker aspects (efficiency and constraint) indicate that brokers in specification networks have
to deal with increasing role ambiguity. Furthermore, table 4 shows that in all tests these
effects are significantly larger than the effects of broker positions in delivery networks. A
counter-intuitive finding is that delivery efficiency negatively influences role ambiguity (ß=-
6.50, p=.05). We anticipated a smaller effect in service delivery, but not a negative effect of
broker positions on role ambiguity.
***Insert table 4 about here***
Finally, Model 3 does not support hypothesis 3b. Although we find that delivery
constraint has a significant negative effect on role conflict, we do not obtain that this effect is
larger than that of specification constraint. The power analysis indicates that the data provide
not enough information to reject the claim that the coefficients are equal. The differences
between the parameters are not large enough to be significantly different, although the
directions of the signs of the differences are consistent with the hypothesized ones.
7. Discussion
The continuously changing configuration of workgroups create networks of relationships.
Complementary to informational diversity based on background, a network perspective
allows researchers to explicitly specify an important part of the organizational knowledge
context. Several authors have emphasized that this context is of importance to workgroup
studies (Alderfer, 1987; Homans, 1950). Furthermore focusing on networks that are support
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the to accomplishment of different tasks provides extra insight in workgroup input-output
transformation processes (Feld, 1981; Hackman, 1987).
In this paper we study a few effects of broker-induced informational diversity in
workgroups attaining the specification and delivery of services. Within these workgroups,
knowledge of different knowledge bases gets integrated. Informational diversity refers to the
degree of heterogeneous information. Brokers, since they have diverse contacts, may
contribute to and control informational diversity in workgroups.
We consider two tasks in account management that require specific types of
knowledge. In the first task, that is the service specification task, relevant knowledge answers
what and which questions. The second task, the service delivery task, requires knowledge that
can produce answers to how and when questions. We find that broker induced informational
diversity is not beneficial to every task.
To summarize our results, we find that adding information about broker
characteristics substantially increases the amount of explained variance in our models.
Informational diversity from background variables also has a significant influence. This
suggests that both sets of measures are complementary instead of substitutes. More specific,
support is found for the hypothesized effects between task-specific broker positions and
performance (hypotheses 1b, 2a and 2b). Hypothesis 3a, regarding the differential effect of
task-specific broker positions on role ambiguity, is supported too. We also obtain significant
differences between the same broker characteristics (efficiency and constraint) in different
task networks. Furthermore, a power analysis shows sufficient power for the Wald test we
use to test the significance of the differences between task-specific broker effects.
The empirical findings in this paper should be viewed as explorative results, but most
results presented here are strong results. Further research may be very useful. This study thus
may be regarded as contributing to the insight in knowledge integration processes in service
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firms that utilize account management systems. In the remainder of this section we discuss
some revealing effects of broker positions and non-hypothesized findings.
7.1 Effects of Broker Positions
The results we found in our empirical setting present support most of our hypotheses
concerning the contribution of individuals to organizational performance. The notion that the
individual contribution to organizational performance depends on the broker positions in
different task networks gets empirical supported. This implies that cooperation in workgroups
influence potential contributions to other workgroups.
The informational diversity control aspects of broker positions in the two task
networks influence contributions to organizational performance. However, as we
hypothesized, in service specification tasks this control is beneficial to organizational
performance, while it is detrimental in service delivery tasks. As control is based on the lack
of relationships within knowledge bases we may consider the following consequences. First,
the results seem to indicate that it may be harmful to have an organizational context where
individuals in a similar knowledge base have independent knowledge about how and when
services are to be delivered. An explanation of this finding could include the mutual
adjustment argument. In account management, combinations of service bundles are tailor-
made. Integration of knowledge about the implementation of these service bundles might
need coordination by mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967). This implies that it is necessary
to exchange information during the implementation process. Furthermore, the individuals
involved adjust their activities based on the information they receive. Increasing
informational diversity about implementation routines and procedures might frustrate the
process of mutual adjustment. When individuals in a workgroup have to adjust their activities
too much, this might invoke rigidity to further changes, and this in turn may diminish
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performance. Hence, increasing informational diversity might backfire on a broker in a
service delivery network.
This explanation is consistent with the significant effect we found of service delivery
broker positions on role conflict. Recall that our role conflict measure primarily indicates a
perceived lack of resources to accomplish tasks as expected. Individuals may perceive
excessive demand for their resources, when they individually have to coordinate tasks that are
more efficiently coordinated through mutual adjustment. Furthermore, when coordination is
inefficient, and takes too much time, this might invoke a greater need for resources to be able
to accomplish tasks in the expected time spans.
Another explanation could be that those more embedded in a network are valued more
because they are better understood. Informational diversity has been found to create task
conflict (see Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999). Task conflict might increase performance
because it enhances creativity. However, it may also slow down task accomplishments (see
Dougherty, 1992). In service delivery tasks, where time is an important service aspect, low
informational diversity might be more beneficial.
Further, the results suggest that the effects of service specification broker
characteristics on role ambiguity are larger than the effects of broker aspects in service
delivery networks. Heterogeneous knowledge about what should be done increases role
ambiguity more than heterogeneous knowledge about how and when things should be done.
7.2 Non-Hypothesized Results
Surprisingly, service specification efficiency has no influence on organizational performance,
while service specification constraint does. The difference between the two broker aspects
might shed some light on this finding. Efficiency is based on the direct relationships of a
focal individual. It measures the heterogeneity of knowledge across and within knowledge
bases. Constraint measures the aggregate of the lack of heterogeneity within knowledge
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bases. Less heterogeneity within knowledge bases reduces the control of the focal actor over
informational diversity within the workgroups in which he/she is involved. This difference
between the two measures indicates that it is not so much the heterogeneity of different
knowledge bases, but rather the heterogeneity within knowledge bases, which contributes to
organizational performance. In account management in service industries it may seem quite
obvious that a certain type of service should be offered, but it is the specification of the right
service attributes of that service that creates value. More heterogeneous knowledge about the
specifics of a certain service seems more valuable than heterogeneous knowledge about
different services.
Another non-hypothesized finding is that the degree of efficiency of an individual in
service delivery networks decreases his/her level of role ambiguity. This seems to indicate
that heterogeneous knowledge on different services decreases the uncertainty of what is
expected of a focal individual. We suspect that this knowledge that is explicit in how and
when things should be done creates a benchmark for individuals, which provides more
certainty about expectations.
Finally, the differences between effects of broker characteristics in different networks
on role conflict appeared not significant. The differences were consistent with our hypotheses
but they were too small to be detected with the Wald test. A larger number of observations
and repeated measurement perhaps could bring more clarity on this hypothesis.
7.3 Implications for Account Management
A direct implication we see concerns the staffing of account focused workgroups. Weilbaker
& Weeks (1997), for example, emphasize the importance of further research on personnel
aspects in account management. Ancona & Caldwell (1992) ask the fundamental questions
on how innovative teams should be staffed. The tasks in account management should lead to
customized outcomes, which are often similar to architectural innovations (Henderson &
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Clark, 1990). As such the findings in the “innovation teams”-literature might be applicable to
account management workgroups.
However, a common property of account management systems is that the knowledge
compositions of workgroups experience frequent changes. Our results suggest that it is
necessary to consider network positions in the staffing of account focussed workgroups. This
may of course come naturally when individuals are left free to choose partners for
collaboration. Colarelli & Boos (1992), for example, find in a classroom situation that this
method leads to better results then when groups are composed centrally. However, Hinds, et
al. (2000) find that free choice leads to homogeneous groups, which reduces informational
diversity. Within organizations, the free choice method may be managerial dissatisfying since
insufficient informational diversity is created.
Knowledge management instruments are developed in order to allow individuals to
reach the knowledge they need to perform their tasks. Two types of knowledge management
systems have been identified, that is, a personified and a codified system (Hansen, Tierney &
Nohria, 1999). The personified system may particularly serve the purpose of determining
network positions and identifying potential individuals who may generate the preferred
knowledge composition of workgroups.
7.4 Further Research
There is large scope for further research in the area of task-specific broker positions. The
limitations of our study indicate that further research is necessary to establish the effects of
task-specific knowledge networks. Furthermore, a range of other effects on other dependent
variables needs to be studied (for example, learning, employee satisfaction, and
organizational growth). Also, more fundamental research has to be done on how broker
positions are formed (see Burt, 2000b; Hinds, et al., 2000).
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8. Conclusions
This study explored the effects of task-specific broker positions on performance and role
stressors in an account management system. The results suggested that different
characteristics of broker positions have distinct effects on perceived performance, role
ambiguity and role conflict. Furthermore, these effects were found to be dependent on the
specific knowledge exchange network of the broker position under consideration. In certain
task-specific knowledge networks, characteristics of broker positions have a positive effect
on the perceived contributions to organizational performance. However, other tasks-
dependent broker positions were detrimental to organizational performance. Furthermore,
broker positions often invoked personal costs to those holding them in terms of increased
levels of stress.
We conclude with stating that service specification broker positions benefit
organizations, but service delivery broker positions are detrimental to an organization and
that they also invoke personal costs.
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Tabel 1: Measuring role ambiguity and role conflict
Items ·
Role
Ambiguity*
Role
Conflict
1. I feel certain about how my performances will be evaluated ¾
2. Explanations are clear about what has to be done 0.84
3. I feel certain about how much authority I have 0.84
4. I know that I have divided my time properly ¾
5. I know what my responsibilities are 0.89
6. For my job there exist clear planned goals and objectives 0.75
7. I know exactly what is expected of me 0.89
8. I have to do things that should be done differently 0,64
9. I do things that are apt to be accepted by one person and not accepted by others ¾
10. I work with two or more groups who operate quite differently ¾
11. I work on unnecessary things 0,77
12. I receive incompatible requests from two or more people ¾
13. I receive an assignment without the adequate resources and materials to execute it 0,88
14. I work under incompatible policies and guide lines 0,67
15. I have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment ¾
16. I receive an assignment without the manpower to complete it 0,66
a=0.91 a=0.85
·Items with no score were deleted from the scale. * Items 1 to 7 are scored in a reversed way.
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations (N=55)
Mean S.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Perceived Performance   3.72   0.27
(2) Role Ambiguity   0.00   0.96   0.33
(3) Role Conflict   0.00   0.94   0.21   0.06
(4) Education (1=High)   0.75   0.44   0.02 -0.04   0.08
(5) Function Tenure   1.42   1.67 -0.23   0.19   0.27   0.01
(6) ID Education   0.88   0.35 -0.01   0.13   0.15   0.12   0.15
(7) ID Department & Position   0.90   0.44   0.24   0.34   0.27   0.31   0.11   0.57
(8) Specification Efficiency   0.10   0.06 -0.13   0.27   0.02   0.15   0.17   0.42   0.60
(9) Specification Constraint   0.03   0.02 -0.34 -0.15 -0.25   0.11 -0.07   0.12   0.16   0.55
(10) Delivery Efficiency   0.10   0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.04   0.20   0.08   0.36   0.55   0.70 0.42
(11) Delivery Constraint   0.05   0.04   0.19   0.02 -0.40   0.01 -0.24   0.04   0.10   0.26   0.31   0.43
Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict are regression factor scores with mean zero. ID = Informational Diversity. All
correlations above (below) (-) 0.26 are significant at p <0.05 (two-tailed test). All correlations above (below) (-) 0.34
are significant at p <0.01 (two-tailed test). All correlations above (below) (-) 0.42 are significant at p <0.001 (two-
tailed test).
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Table3: OLS Regression Results (N=55). Individual Level Measures Predicting: Perceived
Contribution to Organizational Performance (1), Role Ambiguity (2) and Role Conflict (3)
Model
Independent Variables 1 2 3
Controls
Education (1=High) -0.00*** (-0.02) -0.19*** (-0.69) -0.04*** (-0.15)
Function Tenure -0.03*** (-1.35) -0.09*** (-1.26) -0.07*** (-0.99)
Informational Diversity
Education
-0.11*** (-1.05) -0.40*** (-1.00) -0.06*** (-0.15)
Informational Diversity
Departments & Positions
-0.32*** (-3.12) -0.81*** (-2.07) -0.80*** (-1.99)
Task-Specific Broker Measures
Specification Efficiency 0.21*** (-0.25) -9.62*** (-3.00) -0.88*** (-0.27)
Specification Constraint -4.61*** (-2.89) -15.18*** (-2.51) -6.17*** (-1.00)
Delivery Efficiency -1.34*** (-2.07) -6.50*** (-2.65) -0.07*** (-0.03)
Delivery Constraint 2.37*** (-2.83) -4.53*** (-1.42) -7.45*** (-2.29)
Intercept 3.70*** (36.26) -0.48*** (-1.24) -0.10****(-0.25)
Statistics
Adj.-R2 0.32** 0.27** 0.19**
F-value 5.51** 3.47** 2.52**
? R2
(adding Broker Measures)
0.28** 0.20** 0.18**
F-value ?R2 of Broker
Measures
4.09** 3.63** 2.99**
*p<0.05; **p<0.01;***p<0.001 t-values in parentheses
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Table 4: Wald Type Tests for the Equality of Coefficients
Role Ambiguity
(Model 2 in table 3)
Role Conflict
(Model 3 in table 3)
I.
(a) Specification Efficiency with (b) Delivery Efficiency
H0: (a)=(b), H1:(a)> (b)
Coefficients (a,b):
(9.62,-6.50)
F = 11.47**
Power = 0.62
H0: (a)=(b), H1:(a)< (b)
Coefficients (a,b):
(-0.88,-0.07)
F = 0.02
Power = 0.00
II.
(c) Specification Constraint with (d) Delivery Constraint
H0: (c)=(d), H1:(c)< (d)
Coefficients (c,d):
(-15.18, 4.53)
F = 7.50**
Power = 0.92
H0: (c)=(d), H1:(c)> (d)
Coefficients (c,d):
(-6.17, -7.45)
F = 0.03
Power = 0.20
III.
I and II Simultaneously
H0: (a)=(b) and (c)=(d)
H1: (a)>(b) and (c)<(d)
F = 7.04**
Power = 0.97
H0: (a)=(b) and (c)=(d)
H1: (a)<(b) and (c)>(d)
F = 0.03
Power = 0.30
*p<.05;** p<.01
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